

2019 Report of the Auditor General of New Brunswick

Volume I

AUDITOR GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK



VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK

Presentation Chapters

- Medicare Cards Department of Health
- Outsourcing of Highway Maintenance and Construction Work – Department of Transportation and Infrastructure
- Overdue Property Tax: Collections and Forgiveness – Department of Finance
- City of Saint John Funding Agreement Special Review - Executive Council Office





Medicare Cards Department of Health

Volume I Chapter 2





VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL du Nouveau-Brunswick

Why We Did This Audit

- <u>Healthcare</u> represents one of government's most significant programs
- There are significant risks associated with weak controls over Medicare cards and related personal information
- Medicare cards, or their equivalent, have been reviewed by other Auditor General offices in Canada



Medicare Cards & Costs

- About 765,000 active Medicare cards at March 31, 2018
- Medicare cards must be presented to access health services


Average annual costs per Medicare cardholder:



Volume I - Chapter 2 2.11, 2.40, Exhibit 2.2




Department of Health Expenditures (**Billions \$**)



Volume I - Chapter 2 Exhibit 2.2 (Interpreted)



Background - Medicare program roles and responsibilities



Objective of our Audit

To determine if the Department of Health (the Department) has processes and controls to ensure:

- Only eligible residents are issued a Medicare Card; and
- The security and privacy of cardholder's information is protected.

Conclusions

- Processes and controls are in place to ensure only eligible residents are issued a Medicare card
- Insufficient procedures to identify cardholders who subsequently become ineligible
 - For example upon leaving the Province
- Steps could be taken to enhance the security features of Medicare cards
- Privacy breaches are occurring due to changes to the Medicare card renewal policy



Overall Highlights & Topics - *Medicare Cards*

- Continued eligibility not well monitored
- Risks linked to outsourced and automatic Medicare card renewal process
- Inefficiencies in Medicare system







Continued Eligibility Not Well Monitored



Initial Application Process is Adequate

- Process for **initial registration** and approval for a Medicare card is **adequate** to ensure that only eligible residents of NB receive a card
- Documents accepted for registration purposes are the same as those accepted in other provinces
- However, we noted an online application for NB Medicare cards would expedite process





Volume I - Chapter 2 2.35, 2.36

Risk of Ineligible NB Medicare Cards

It is important to identify ineligible NB Medicare Cards. Examples of risk:

- Ineligible cardholder (e.g.: former resident) who <u>continues to use</u> their NB Medicare card
- Insured health services they receive (in or out of province) would be <u>inappropriately paid for by NB</u>
 - In this case, their current province of residence is meant to pay for their insured health services

Volume I - Chapter 2 2.39-2.42



Identifying Ineligible NB Medicare Cards

- We found Medicare <u>does not</u> have sufficient procedures to timely identify/cancel ineligible NB Medicare cards
- Department <u>could not fully explain</u> why there were more active Medicare cards than NB residents

We found Medicare <u>does not</u>:

- Assess card usage patterns (e.g. lack of usage)
- Thoroughly review if cardholders who receive out-ofprovince health services are NB residents

Volume I - Chapter 2 2.44, 2.42, One-page Chapter Summary, 2.43



Risks Linked to Outsourced and Automatic Medicare Card Renewal Process



More Risk For Unknown Savings

- We found the automatic renewal process adopted in 2014 has **weakened controls** over Medicare cards
- The automatic card renewal process was anticipated to save \$218,000 annually
- However, the Department provided <u>no evidence</u> as to how cost savings were calculated or ever achieved



Medicare Card Automatic Renewal Process

- NB is the only province where cardholders are **no longer required to reapply** when their card expires
- Once initially approved, cardholders may never again be evaluated for eligibility
- The **risk** of a usable Medicare card getting into the wrong person's hands **has increased** under the automatic renewal process



Risks Associated With Contracting Out to Medavie Blue Cross


- In 2013, Medicare card production and distribution was contracted out to Medavie Blue Cross (Medavie)
 - Medavie further subcontracted this work to CPI Card Group (CPI)
- This placed a key process outside of government
- We found Medicare **receives no independent assurance** on controls from Medavie or CPI

Volume I - Chapter 2 2.61, 2.65



Privacy Risks & Breaches

- We found Medicare cards are mailed <u>without</u> confirming mailing addresses
- **5,800** automatic renewal cards returned as undeliverable between 2015-2019
- 157 recorded Medicare privacy breaches since 2017





Volume I - Chapter 2 2.51, 2.53, 2.48, Exhibit 2.1

Inefficiencies in Medicare System



Areas Medicare System Could Be Improved

- Upgrading Medicare's registration system could reduce the number of manual procedures
- NB Medicare cards do not include photo identification as a security feature

– QC, ON, BC include photo on their health cards

- Quebec doctors bill NB Medicare directly resulting in high administrative burden for NB
 - Reciprocal billing was agreed to by all other provinces
 - Auditor General of Quebec has expressed concerns around errors and overbilling by Quebec doctors

Volume I - Chapter 2 2.36, 2.71, 2.85, 2.86



AGNB Recommendations

- **16 recommendations** to the Medicare Branch of the Department of Health:
 - Improve registration and continued eligibility monitoring process
 - Evaluate risks / savings
 - Enhance card security and privacy controls
 - Upgrade registration system
 - Negotiate reciprocal billing with Quebec
 - Develop procedures, plans & performance indicators

Volume I - Chapter 2 Recommendations and Responses





Outsourcing of Highway Maintenance and Construction Work

Department of Transportation and Infrastructure

Volume I Chapter 3

AUDITOR GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK

Why We Did This Audit Follow-up Work

- In 2018, we completed follow-up work on our 2013 Pre-Mixed Asphalt Procurement report
- We found risks related to how certain capital maintenance programs in the Department had been outsourced
- We also found inconsistencies in who did road repair work throughout the province (i.e. outsourced vs. inhouse)

Volume I - Chapter 3 3.4



Objective of our Audit

To determine if:

The decision-making process followed by the Department of Transportation and Infrastructure (DTI) to outsource capital rehabilitation, maintenance work and related equipment procurement is evidence based.

Background - Outsourcing



- Outsourcing work is at times necessary and beneficial
 - Common reasons: Inadequate staffing, lack of expertise and need for specialized equipment
- Events in other provinces and countries have highlighted the risk and negatively affected residents
- Outsourcing critical construction and maintenance work has risks:
 - Company bankruptcy, services not delivered on time or to appropriate quality

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Volume I - Chapter 3 3.77, 3.12-3.15

Volume I - Chapter 3 3.24, Exhibit 3.3 (Modified & Condensed)

Outsourcing in NB

Examples of DTI outsourced activities include:

- Paving
- Grading
- Line painting
- Brush cutting

Total highway construction tenders awarded by DTI		
(in millions)		
2015-16	2016-17	2017-18
\$219	\$172	\$223





Conclusions

 In certain cases, decisions to outsource work were not based on evidence nor supported by an objective analysis of costs and consequences.

The Department of Transportation and Infrastructure:

- Focused on economic development and relied on subjective judgement when making outsourcing decisions
- Outsourced work at the taxpayer's expense to **support the private sector** and encourage **economic growth**

Volume I - Chapter 3 3.10



Overall Highlights & Topics - Outsourcing of Highway Maintenance and Construction Work

• No framework for outsourcing decisions


• Programs knowingly outsourced at higher cost



No Framework for Outsourcing Decisions



Department's 2016-2018 Reorganization and Improvement Initiative



Volume I - Chapter 3 3.29, Exhibit 3.5 (Modified)



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No Outsourcing Policy or Decision-making Framework

- We found the Department <u>does not</u> have a **policy** or a decision-making **framework** to determine what to outsource
- This could lead to decisions influenced (or perceived to be) by other factors such as assisting certain industry groups or regions at the taxpayer's expense

Risk of Supplier Over-dependence

- We found the Department <u>does not</u> assess risk of supplier over-dependence when outsourcing
- Supplier availability can affect competitiveness and cost of outsourcing work

We found 55 tenders awarded where only <u>one bid</u> was received:

• Tenders valued at \$46 million



Volume I - Chapter 3 3.36-3.38

Programs Knowingly Outsourced At Higher Cost



Experts Found Chipseal Outsourcing More Expensive

- Prior to 2016, Department analysis found it would be up to 18% more expensive to outsource chipseal work
- However, in 2016, Minister announced decision to outsource chipseal work throughout the province
- Minister at the time believed chipsealing through private sector was "*the right thing to do*"






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Volume I - Chapter 3 3.48-3.51, Exhibit 3.6

Chipseal Outsourced Despite Known Higher Cost

• We estimate increase in outsourced chipseal work between 2016-2018 <u>cost an extra \$1.7 million</u>



Volume I - Chapter 3 3.53, Exhibit 3.7 (Modified)



Plough Truck Procurement Outsourced Despite Known Higher Cost

- In 2016, Department found buying pre-assembled plough trucks cost roughly \$25,000 (or 10%) more per truck than building in-house
- Despite analysis, Department outsourced another
 30 trucks
- Total **added cost was nearly \$1 million**, equivalent to the cost of building four more trucks





Volume I - Chapter 3 3.63-3.65, Exhibit 3.10

Government Responded to Private Sector Request for More Work Even if it Cost More

- Department was directed to outsource more work to the private sector
- In certain cases for large culverts, tender and design **costs were significant** compared to cost of actual work
 - -This meant outsourcing was more expensive than doing the work in-house
- Also critical to keep **in-house capability** for bridge and culvert work for **faster emergency response**

AGNB VGNB



AGNB Recommendations

- **7 recommendations** to the Department of Transportation and Infrastructure:
 - Develop an evidence based outsourcing policy and a decision-making framework
 - Plan and evaluate using evidenced-based business case analysis (cost-effective and timely manner)
 - Assess the risk of over dependence on a single supplier

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Volume I - Chapter 3 Recommendations and Responses



Overdue Property Tax: Collections and Forgiveness

Department of Finance

Volume I Chapter 4

AUDITOR GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK

VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK

Why We Did This Audit

- Property tax represents over \$1 billion per year in revenue for the Province and municipalities
- Over \$30 million in property tax and penalties was forgiven in six years (2012-2018)
- Forgiveness of overdue property tax represents lost tax revenue and creates a perception of unfairness to taxpayers who remain current




Volume I - Chapter 4 4.3

Objective of our Audit

To determine if the Department of Finance:

- Collects overdue property tax in accordance with the *Real Property Tax Act*
- Makes property tax forgiveness decisions or recommendations in accordance with applicable policies and legislation

Background Annual Property Tax Billed (\$ millions)



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Volume I - Chapter 4 Exhibit 4.2

Property Taxes in NB

• We found about **\$9 million per year** is not collected in property tax



As of March 31, 2018 about:

- **\$109 million** in total overdue property tax and penalties
- **51,000 properties** with overdue property tax

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Volume I - Chapter 4 4.25, 4.15-4.16

Background

- **Property tax is forgiven** where the property owner has filed for bankruptcy or ownership of the property has transferred to the Province
- **Discretionary forgiveness** is used to resolve instances where hardship has occurred or is likely to
- **Province bears the cost** of forgiveness in its entirety (both provincial and municipal taxes)

Conclusions

We concluded that the Department of Finance:

- Lacks policies to direct its use of discretionary property tax forgiveness
- **Does not actively manage** the property tax collections efforts of Service New Brunswick
- Lacks detailed criteria and prioritization of properties to be sold for non-payment of property tax



Overall Highlights & Topics - Overdue *Property Tax: Collections and Forgiveness*

• Property Tax Forgiveness

• Overdue Property Tax Collections


Volume I - Chapter 4 One-Page Chapter Summary (Extract)



Property Tax Forgiveness



Over <u>\$30 Million</u> of Forgiven Property Tax and Penalties in Six Years (2012-2018)



Volume I - Chapter 4 4.38, Exhibit 4.5 (Modified)



No Policies For Discretionary Forgiveness

- Despite millions in discretionary property tax forgiveness, Department has **no policies** to guide Tax Commissioner in exercising authority
- Property tax forgiveness decisions **are not publicly reported** (unlike grant payments)
- Debt forgiveness **may** be awarded in an **inconsistent** and **inequitable** manner
- For example: We found two commercial properties were forgiven a total of \$680,000 in response to proposals received

Volume I – Chapters 1 & 4 4.43, 1.19, 4.47



No Control Mechanisms to Detect Errors

• We found the Department processed six claims for bankruptcy property tax forgiveness **twice in error**



This allowed double the benefit intended to these property tax accounts

- Department <u>was not aware</u> of duplication issue
- Internal audit needed to ensure system controls are functioning

Volume I - Chapter 4 4.44, 4.45



Department Did Not Respond to Treasury Board Directive

- In 2014, Treasury Board directed the Department to review the *Real Property Tax Act*
- Department indicated it did not respond as responsibility for collections had shifted to SNB
 - However, Act clearly states Minister of Finance is responsible for collections of property tax
- In our view, delegating the collections process **does not absolve the Department** of its responsibility under the *Act*

Volume I - Chapter 4 4.49, 4.50



Overdue Property Tax Collections



Department Unable to Resolve Overdue Property Tax in a Timely Manner

- It is Department's practice to proceed to property tax sale if four years overdue and over \$500
- Department processes about **830 properties** through property tax sales each year
- However, about **6,000 properties** were eligible to be sold for non-payment of property tax in 2018
- Potential **revenue will remain uncollected** given it could take years to process

Volume I - Chapter 4 4.20, 4.27



No Prioritization for Property Tax Sale

- Selection of the **most impactful** properties, while ensuring fairness, is critical given Department's limited processing ability
 - For example, we found 43 properties represent
 \$12 million in overdue taxes and penalties; or
 - In some cases, property tax sale may not be appropriate or practical (e.g.: causing homelessness or due to contamination)
- Finance has not provided direction to SNB for identifying properties appropriate for property tax sale beyond "four years / \$500" criteria

Volume I - Chapter 4 4.29. 4.16



Department Does Not Actively Manage SNB Collections Performance of Overdue Accounts


- We found the Department does not actively manage the performance of SNB collections
- We've previously reported a lack of clear direction of SNB has contributed to decreasing effectiveness of collections
- Our recommendation to register overdue property tax accounts with CRA Refund Set-off Program (garnishing tax refunds) has **not been implemented**

Volume I - Chapter 4 4.31, 4.33, 4.18



AGNB Recommendations

- 6 recommendations to the Department of Finance:
 - Develop policy, criteria and controls
 - Calculate and track impact of uncollected municipal property tax
 - Clarify SNB performance expectations and monitor
 - Arrange internal audit by Comptroller
 - Consult with Treasury Board to determine if 2014 directive to review Act is still appropriate







City of Saint John Funding Agreement Special Review - Executive Council Office

Volume I Chapter 5

AUDITOR GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK

VÉRIFICATEUR GÉNÉRAL DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK

Why we reviewed the City of Saint John Funding Agreement

The Auditor General chose to review this funding agreement due to potential:

- Inherent risk to provincial taxpayers and
- Non-compliance with provincial Acts and regulations



Background

- City of Saint John was facing an anticipated budget deficit of about \$6 million in 2018
 - Due in part to population decline, property tax assessment freeze, etc.
- July 2017, Mayor stated City was in *"crisis"* and asked Province for a *"new deal"* to address financial situation
- September 2017, Premier pledged Province would work with City on a *"new deal"*



Volume I - Chapter 5 5.9, 5.12



Key Terms and Conditions of Final Signed Agreement

- **Province to**: provide up to \$22.8 million to the City of Saint John over a 3-year period to address anticipated budget deficits
- **City to:** limit impact on frontline services and meet reporting requirements, among other things
- Together, establish of a joint working committee to evaluate the success of the Agreement and review long term solutions

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.1, 5.39



Conclusions

We concluded the City of Saint John Funding Agreement constitutes excessive risk to taxpayers by:

- not including specific outcomes to be achieved;
- failing to address City's challenges or mitigate inherent risk to the Province (as of April 2019); and
- providing funding based on the City's anticipated deficit level, creating an inappropriate incentive for the City to incur deficits in order to maximize funding

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.3-5.5



Conclusions - Continued

- We believe the Agreement circumvented requirements under the *Local Governance Act* discouraging municipalities from having ongoing operating deficits.
- Treasury Board (TB) did not comply with the *Financial Administration Act* to ensure proper legislative authority through an Environment and Local Government (ELG) budgetary appropriation before providing funding





Overall Highlights & Topics – *City of Saint John Funding Agreement*

- Excessive Risk to New Brunswick Taxpayers
- Agreement Was Rushed
- AG Concerns with Legislative Compliance

Volume I - Chapter 5 One-Page Chapter Summary (Extract)



Excessive Risk to New Brunswick Taxpayers



Financial Assistance Dependent On City Reporting Deficits

- Agreement was based off deficit projections
- We found decision support documents were difficult to follow, lacked clarity and in our opinion <u>did not</u> include adequate analysis to support final Cabinet decision

Year	Anticipated Agreement Funding	Payments to Date
2018	\$3.5 M	\$1.75 M
2019	8.9 M	-
2020	10.4 M	-
Total	\$22.8 Million	\$1.75 Million

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.42 (Modified), 5.21, 5.72



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Removal of Key Clauses Protecting Province's Interests

Two clauses removed after City disagreed, representing increased risk to Province:

- Public Sector Accounting Standards clause
 - Provincial negotiators wanted to ensure City could not manipulate size of reported deficit and thereby affect funding
- Budget appropriations clause
 - Clause meant Province would not be obligated to make payment before obtaining budget appropriation, as required under legislation

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.46-5.51



Key Committee Report Not Delivered

- Joint working committee was established to evaluate the success of Agreement and review long term solutions to improve City's fiscal condition
- We found a key working committee report, due January 1, 2019 under Agreement, had not been completed
- Delaying this report could impact City's ability to address future financial challenges

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.68-5.70



Risk of Setting a Precedent

- Agreement is meant to respond to Saint John's so called "unique" circumstances
- However, providing funding to a municipality to address a projected, ongoing deficit **could incite others to seek the same funding**
- This precedent would represent additional risk for Province

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.44-5.45



Agreement Was Rushed



Former Premier Appeared to Guarantee Assistance Prior to Cabinet's Approval

- In a **December 2017** letter, former Premier stated to mayor:
 - "We can begin by making investments today that will alleviate short-term budget pressures in the upcoming 2018 fiscal year"
 - "you have my guarantee that the Province will work with you towards short-term assistance for investments in a growth agenda while we continue to work shoulder to shoulder on a new deal for Saint John".
- Letter **did not** indicate apparent guarantee was subject to Cabinet approval, departmental consultation, confirmation of legal, appropriation and budget authority

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.17-5.19



Rushed Agreement Decisions Led To Issues

- City leveraged 2018 provincial election timing to gain support
- \$23 million Agreement negotiated and developed in 2-months
 - We believe this resulted in development and implementation issues
- Public communications in advance of agreement ratification
 - Errors in news release flagged by Department of Post-Secondary Education, Training and Labour

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.32-5.35, 5.45, 5.57, 5.63



Key Department Not Involved in Decisions

- Key staff in Office of the Premier were intricately involved in development of Agreement
- However, Environment and Local Government (ELG) officials indicated it was not involved
 - ELG only made aware of funding responsibility after Cabinet decision in February, 2018
 - Next day, Executive Council Office (ECO) gave unsigned, incomplete contract to ELG



Department Struggled to Implement Agreement

- Lack of information made it difficult for ELG to manage Agreement
- Communications between staff highlight **confusion** around responsibility
- ELG was to provide funding of \$1.75 million at the end of August 2018, however ELG was:
 - Still verifying terms and conditions with the City in July 2018
 - Trying to determine how it would obtain necessary budget authority in mid-August

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.57, 5.58



Unauthorized Spending Decision

- ELG made \$1.75 million payment to City in August 2018, however:
 - No budget appropriation or supplementary estimate was approved by Legislative Assembly, despite Cabinet direction to do so
 - No budget transfers were made to ELG
 - Treasury Board staff stated these would be completed at end of year, as their standard practice, and believed this was compliant with *Financial Administration Act*
- However, Treasury Board noted the Act was outdated and as such, open to interpretation

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.72-5.79



AG Concerns with Legislative Compliance



Treasury Board Not Compliant With Act

- We believe the process undertaken in this instance **does not comply** with *Financial Administration Act*
- In our June 2018 report, **we raised similar concerns** and believe the Act requires modernization
- We believe this to be another example where the **spirit of the Act was ignored** and appropriate approval was not obtained

AGNB VGNB 77

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.72-5.84

Agreement Effectively Circumvented Legislation

- Section 100(8) of the *Local Governance Act* discourages New Brunswick municipalities from operating with ongoing deficits
- In our view, the Agreement effectively circumvented the Act as the Province agreed to fund the city's deficit for three years

AGNB Recommendations

- **4 recommendations** to the Executive Council Office (ECO)
- **1 recommendation** to ECO and Treasury Board
- **1 recommendation** to Treasury Board and Comptroller:
 - Ensure funding decisions follow due process, are justified, supported, authorized, etc.
 - Ensure funding agreements do not effectively override the spirit and intent of legislation
 - Involve all relevant provincial entities
 - Review and update Financial Administration Act
 - Develop a records retention policy for Premier's Office throughout government transitions

GNB VGNB 79

Volume I - Chapter 5 Recommendations and Responses

Potential Auditor General Act Obstruction

- We found evidence that departments involved **did not provide all** documentation and communications we requested
- No records provided to our office by the Premier's Office
- Attorney General (OAG) cited solicitor-client privilege and **did not provide any information**
- **Uncertain** whether our findings and conclusions would be altered had we received this information

Volume I - Chapter 5 5.26-5.33



Auditor General Closing Remarks

Reoccurring theme of risk, whether it be relating to:

- Privacy breaches
- Outsourcing programs and services without a business case
- Lacking policies and internal controls
- Removing contractual safeguards protecting the Province



Volume I - Chapter 1 1.3

Questions?

